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Abstract
We propose a methodology to perform an in-depth analysis on different password
guessers and their guessing abilities. We devise new metrics and statistics that di-
rectly compare the types of passwords each guesser generates, extending analysis
beyond number of passwords guessed which is the primary form of analysis in liter-
ature currently. This approach allows for a fine-grained analysis where we compare
the guesses produced by each guesser when trained on varied real-world datasets and
under different conditions (e.g., limited training data, limited number of guesses, or
dissimilar training and testing data). We find that similarity of training to testing
data is more important than dataset size, and that some guessers are better equipped
to deal with dissimilarity than others. We demonstrate that guessers often produce
dissimilar guesses, even when trained on the same training data. This result is lever-
aged to show how guessers with lower resource requirements can be combined to guess
a comparable number of passwords as more resource intensive tools. Our method-
ology can be applied in the future to better compare new guessing tools, and our
insights allow us to provide concrete advice for systems administrators performing
reactive checking with modern tools.
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To authorize legitimate access to resources or information, a computer system re-
quires authentication to verify a user’s identity. Typically, this verification is done
with something the user knows (e.g., a text password, or PIN), something the user
has (e.g., security tokens), or something the user is (e.g., retina scans or other bio-
metrics). Studies have shown how text passwords are considered an insecure form of
authentication [14, 31, 56, 64, 68, 85, 86, 90]. Research into alternate, more secure au-
thentication systems has proven ineffective at replacing text passwords as a dominant
form of authentication [15].
1.1 Motivation
Despite their popularity, text passwords—from here on referred to as passwords—
suffer from many security issues. Given the importance and frequent use of passwords,
the news of frequent password leaks [45] is even more alarming. Leaks may result from
mistakenly giving passwords to attackers [78], password reuse across accounts [25],
or online and offline attacks on authentication systems [14, 31, 56, 64, 68, 85, 86, 90].
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While one can defend against online attacks by limiting the number of login attempts
allowed, defending against offline attacks is more challenging. In offline attacks, an
attacker steals a database of (usually) hashed passwords, and tries to recover (or
“crack”) the passwords through offline guessing. As this database is offline, it is out
of our control, and there is no limit to the number of guess attempts an attacker can
make. It is recommended that authentication systems use computationally expensive
hash functions to slow down an attacker’s guessing progress. Unfortunately, even
with the most computationally expensive hash functions, many passwords can be
easily guessed, as users often create predictable passwords. Furthermore, these leaked
passwords can reveal information about unleaked passwords as they are often similar
to each other [50]. Worse yet, password reuse between accounts is common [25], so
compromising a password for one account can lead to the compromising of other
accounts.
Despite decades of research into alternate, more secure, authentication systems,
passwords remain a dominant form of authentication [15]. Text password systems
often have an advantage in deployment as they are easy to implement and familiar to
most users [15]. These advantages reduce the likelihood of passwords being replaced in
the foreseeable future. To protect against password guessing attacks, administrators
are advised to perform password checking, either proactively at the time of password
creation or reactively through attempting to crack their own password databases
[12]. These assessments can only be as accurate and powerful as the tools used
to perform them. However, there is considerable uncertainty as to which password
guessers to use, in a particular use case, as the only available data regarding password
guessing behaviour is their success rate under disparate benchmarks. To make an
informed decision, an administrator must understand how password guessers behave,
compare to, and compliment each other under a variety of conditions. Unfortunately,
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the literature lacks both an analytical framework for studying guessers’ behaviours
and studies involving a deep comparison of many guessers’ behaviours under varied
conditions.
1.2 Thesis Summary
Previous research has focused on developing stronger guessers and training datasets,
with less emphasis on comparing and complementing each other. We propose an
analytical framework to compare the behaviours of password guessers under varied
settings. Using this framework, we analyze a number of well-studied and popular
password guessing tools and training password datasets to reveal important practical
insights and comparisons. Our analyses demonstrate that guessers offer various levels
of generalizability, and their success rates are more closely related to the similarity
between training and testing datasets than training dataset size. Our results also
show that guessers often generate dissimilar guesses, which can be leveraged for more
effective password checking. We show how administrators can get more bang for
their buck by using combinations of computationally-cheap guessers that, when used
together, compare to computationally-intensive guessers. A key take-away from our
analysis is that the value of a password guesser is not only in its success rate, but
also in its ability to compliment other guessers. Our findings allow us to provide
concrete recommendations for system administrators performing password checking.
Our analytical framework serves future password research as well as practitioners
for understanding new guessing tools’ behaviour, and their ability to compliment or
substitute other existing guessers.
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1.3 Thesis Statement
This thesis proposes an analytical framework for comparing password guessers. Un-
der this framework, the thesis analyzes various state-of-the-art password guesses in
various circumstances to discover how their behaviours change and compliment each
other. Using its analyses, this thesis also explores how to combine low-resource pass-
word guessers to achieve comparable results of strong, high-resource guessers.
The following questions are addressed in this thesis:
1. How can one objectively compare password guessers beyond comparing success-
ful guessing rates?
2. How do the behaviours of password guessers change when their training and
testing data change?
3. How can multiple password guessers be used together effectively?
1.4 Contributions
The thesis contributions are as follows: (1) The design and implementation of a
framework for in-depth analysis and comparison of different password guessers beyond
the traditional method of only comparing guessing success rates. (2) A detailed
analysis of password guesser behaviours under various training and testing datasets.
(3) The design, implementation, and evaluation of a method for combining multiple
password guessers together to compliment each other for increased guessing success




• Chapter 2: Related Works presents previous work in password research. It
focuses on the weaknesses of passwords, alternative authentication, password
composition policies, password strength meters, password guessing techniques,
and lastly discuss where this work fits in the literature.
• Chapter 3: Metrics and Algorithms describes the password summarization
metrics and comparison algorithms used extensively throughout the work.
• Chapter 4: Experimental Methodology describes in detail the experi-
ments used to compare, contrast, and combine password datasets and password
guessing techniques.
• Chapter 5: Experiments presents and analyzes the results from the tech-
niques described in Chapter 4.
• Chapter 6: Discussion explains recommendations for how the described tech-
niques could be used in non-research settings.
• Chapter 7: Future Work and Conclusions presents a summary of the work





Passwords are often the first line of defense in protecting our confidential information.
Unfortunately, it has been repeatedly shown that user passwords are often similar or
identical, and are consequently guessable by an adversary [14, 21, 61, 63]. With no
alternative catching on currently, researchers have been attempting to improve the
strength of passwords a number of different ways and demonstrate how easy current
passwords are to guess.
Our literature review begins with an investigation of the weaknesses of passwords
(see Section 2.2) to provide insight on the troubling situation we find ourselves in.
We then explore work in alternative authentication techniques (see Section 2.3), their
strengths, weaknesses, and why they haven’t replaced text passwords as a dominant
form of authentication. Following this, we explore two prominent fields of strength-
ening text passwords: password composition policies (see Section 2.4) and password
strength meters (see Section 2.5). Lastly, we explore related work on password guess-
ing tools (see Section 2.6) and discuss how our research fits in with previous work
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(see Section 2.7).
2.2 Weaknesses of Passwords
Since the use of passwords for authentication is so wide-spread, one would expect
passwords to be relatively secure. Unfortunately, passwords are widely regarded as
insecure for a number of reasons including poor storage habits by administrators
[45] and poor creation habits by users. We begin our literature review by exploring
research on how and why users create weak passwords. Even if an administrator uses
the most secure systems for password authentication, a weak password created by a
user makes their account vulnerable.
While a completely random password may not be memorable for a user, users
might employ many different techniques to increase the memorability of their pass-
word. Unfortunately, many of these techniques create noticeable patterns in their
passwords which can be exploited. Some examples of these techniques include key-
board patterns in passwords [74] (e.g., “qwerty” or “1q2w3e4”) or replacing letters
with similar looking special characters [49]. The rampant use and weaknesses of
keyboard patterns were studied by Schweitzer et al. [74]. While these patterns may
appear random at a glance, they are easy for a user to remember. Using visualization
techniques, the keyboard patterns were collected and categorized. This information
was then shown to be effective in improving the success rate of guessing attacks.
By investigating five different datasets, Jakobsson et al. [49] discover how special
characters (e.g., @, ?, etc.) are typically used in passwords. Typically, they found
special characters were placed at the end of a password, but some were used according
to simple patterns like “L33T”. The “L33T” pattern is where similar looking symbols
and numbers are substituted for letters (such as replacing ‘a’ with ‘@’). The most
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common special characters were ones used in “L33T” (e.g. ‘@’ or ‘&’) whereas symbols
not used commonly in “L33T” were rarely used (e.g. ‘?’ or ‘}’). These special
characters were still the most used even if a password wasn’t written in “L33T”.
Password re-use is also a rampantly used technique to remember passwords. A
study of over 500 thousand users by Florencio et al. [34] investigated how prevalent
this is. On average, users seem to have 7 unique passwords, but an unsettling discovery
was how the average password is used for approximately 6 different websites. In
general, stronger passwords were reused less than weaker passwords. These weaker
passwords being used for more websites could have disastrous consequences, as these
passwords are more vulnerable to attack at one location. Once a password is leaked
from a website, an attack against logins at other websites with the same password
becomes simple.
Users may also alter their passwords in predictable ways. While this creates a
unique password, these passwords are typically simple to guess. A survey and analysis
of leaked password datasets by Das et al. [25] found that 77% users either re-use or
modify an existing password between logins on different websites. This information
is leveraged to create a cross-site password guessing algorithm, which manages to
guess 30% of a user’s transformed passwords within 100 guesses, compared to the
14% guessed by a standard guessing algorithm.
A 50 person study was performed by Hanamsagar et al. [42] to determine reasoning
behind password habits. By asking the participants to log into 12 actual accounts
(where the passwords were semantically transformed for privacy reasons) the authors
were given the opportunity to question the participants about their actual password
habits. They found that people had 80 online accounts on average, a drastic increase
from the previous estimate of 25 by Florenco et al. [34]. They also found that password
reuse is rampant, even for accounts participants stated were important (i.e. bank
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accounts). Participants typically claimed that they didn’t reuse passwords or only
shared passwords between unimportant accounts. Despite belief of the contrary, risk-
averse participants did not produce stronger passwords. While many participants
understand good password creation strategies, some still had weak passwords. Many
participant’s passwords had some strong characteristics, but were typically shorter
than 10 characters.
Some users have also been known to use personal information, such as their name,
birthday, or username, to improve the memorability of their password. Dürmuth et
al. [32] investigated how including this information might be exploited by attackers.
They start by calculating the Jaccard index and Longest Common Substring (LCSS)
between passwords and personal information. While only a relatively small number
of passwords seem to have personal information in them, first names, birthdays, and
usernames are found to have the highest overlap with passwords. This information is
then used to boost the abilities of a Markov-based password guesser, resulting in a 5%
increase in passwords guessed at 100 million guesses with limited access to personal
information.
Understanding languages used by users might also be leveraged by attackers. Li et
al. [57] studied 100 million passwords, comparing the differences between English and
Chinese passwords. They found that the top 5 most popular Chinese passwords made
up 4.14% of all Chinese passwords studied, compared to the top 5 English passwords
only making up 1.69% of all English passwords studied. A major discovery was that
Chinese users prefer digits in their passwords compared to English users. Pinyins and
dates appeared more often in Chinese passwords as well. It was generally believed that
Chinese passwords were stronger than English ones on average, but a Probabilistic
Context Free Greammar (PCFG)-based password guesser was able to guess 34% more
Chinese passwords when Pinyins and date rules were added to training.
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A large-scale study by Ji et al. [51] investigated how easily passwords can be
guessed by both standard and state-of-the-art password guessers. With 145 million
real world passwords, this is one of the largest studies in this matter to date. They find
that in general, brute force password guessing is unnervingly successful at guessing
passwords. Guessers that use training in general out-perform brute-force guessers
when training and testing with different parts of the same dataset (which they call
intra-site training). Interestingly, intra-site training does not always have a better
performance than cross-site training.
Expanding on part of this work, Ji et al. [50] also demonstrated correlations be-
tween passwords across different data sets and then between a user’s password and
personal information. They showed that data sets of the same language have the
highest correlation scores with each other and that higher correlation scores (Jaccard
index and cosine similarity) lead to a higher percentage of password cracks when
one data set is used as a training list for the other, even between data sets that are
different languages. The attack simulation methods used were Weir’s PCFG guesser,
Veras’s semantic guesser, OMEN, and JtR-M. Another discovery was that a high
number of passwords could be guessed based off of personal information (e.g. edu-
cation, company, phone number, and address). While Ji et al. [50], like Dürmuth et
al. [32], had limited access to personal information, the addition of it allowed them
to guess 24.6% of CSDN and 33.2% of Duduniu within 1130 guesses.
Al-Sabah et al. [8] analyzed a meta-data rich leak from a major Middle Eastern
bank. The leaked data included detailed personal information such as name, gender,
email, addresses, nationality information, and recovery questions and answers. The
passwords for 79,960 accounts were recovered using John the Ripper and Hashcat,
but only 65,941 were analyzed demographically due to the limited size of less fre-
quent demographic groups. Four different demographic groups were created based
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on linguistic or cultural similarities. It was impossible to perfectly split people into
linguistic or cultural groupings based off of this information as a single country may
have a diverse set of languages and cultures within it. Despite not being a perfect
split, the passwords made by people in these groupings demonstrated their own trends
and biases. For example, people from the Arabic group were more likely to include
their phone number in their password compared to the other groups. It was also
observed that the passwords from the English group had higher guessability accord-
ing to zxcvbn despite them using less personal information in their passwords. This
could be due to cultural bias as zxcvbn uses an English-based dictionary to estimate
guessability.
To aid in memorability while also creating what appear to be stronger passwords,
many researchers have recommended that users use phrases to create mnemonic pass-
words. A study by Yang et al. [95] began investigating the security of mnemonic
passwords. By evaluating mnemonic passwords separately from non-mnemonic pass-
words, the authors strove to get a better understanding of the actual strength of these
password strategies. When participants were given instruction to create personalized
sentences for their passwords, the resulting passwords appeared less frequently when
compared to participants who were given no instruction on types of phrases to use.
Common sentences and well known quotes were common otherwise, resulting in high
frequency passwords. This leads to a recommendation of providing high-quality in-
structions and examples to increase the strength of passwords. Over 50% of the
passwords in 4 groups of mnemonic models were able to be guessed in 20 attempts
when the sentences and passwords from the other 4 groups were used for training.
The other two groups were excluded from this evaluation because their generation
rules are notably different from the other groups.
Kiesel et al. [53] evaluated the entropy and β-success rate of mnemonic passwords.
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A large-scale sentence corpus was created using the ClueWeb12 web page crawl and
this corpus was used to generate mnemonic passwords. Only English sentences were
considered for this work. The study tested 18 unique password generation rules. As
the generation rules became more complicated, the strength of the passwords created
increased. It was also discovered that the complexity of the sentence used for the
mnemonic password increased the strength of a password against online attacks, but
had little effect against offline attacks. Password length increased strength against of-
fline attacks but showed almost no improvement against online attacks. If an attacker
knew the generation process of the mnemonic password then their success chances
were drastically improved, even without knowledge of any sentences used.
Bonneau et al. [14] compared the anonymized Yahoo! password dataset distribu-
tion against a uniform distribution. They found that there is little variation in the
guessing difficulty of passwords created by user groups they could identify. While
the password distributions would be different, all of the user groups created weak
password distributions. Registering a payment card with the account had no greater
impact than demographic factors. The distribution of the Yahoo! dataset was also
comparable to the distribution of the RockYou dataset, showing that these distribu-
tion similarities are not isolated to the Yahoo! dataset. Unfortunately, most of the
techniques used require very large sample sizes to determine a dataset’s guessability
accurately.
All of the passwords at Carnegie Mellon University were studied by Mazurek et
al. [63] to investigate trends and patterns over different demographics. The password
policy at the university required a password to contain a minimum of 8 characters
and 4 character classes. The passwords were three fold cross validated on a password
guesser trained with two training folds and a set of public passwords. The public
password set contained pruned password leaks to contain passwords following the
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same policy as the university. A number of correlations were found between different
demographics and password strength. For example, users associated with computer
science created passwords 1.8 times stronger than users associated with the business
school. It was also seen that stronger passwords correlated with higher rates of error
during login attempts.
Mourouzis et al. [65] compared how passwords have changed over time. They
compared 4 password datasets, MySpace, RockYou, phpBB, and Xato, to a dataset
of bad passwords compiled for this work. They calculated the Levenshtein distances
of passwords from each for the 4 datasets from the dataset of bad passwords and
compared the distributions. They found that passwords created later tended to be
less similar to the bad passwords. However, the bad passwords could have been
based on older password data, which would explain why this happened. The authors
argued that users are becoming more aware of security, leading to this positive change.
The passwords in the datasets were then clustered by mapping the passwords to a
10-dimensional vector and performing k-means clustering analysis. This showed an
improvement over time with respect to password length and mixing character types.
The distributions of characters chosen were shown to be similar between all of the
datasets.
With all of the vulnerabilities of passwords discussed, it is little wonder why
researchers have been investigating alternative forms of authentication. These alter-
native forms could alleviate the issues found in passwords and generally decrease the
risk of a breach to a user’s account. Still each form of authentication seems to have
its own issues, so it is a matter of if the benefits outweigh the issues.
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2.3 Alternative Authentication
Passwords aren’t the only form of authentication, they are merely the most widely
used. Authentication schemes generally fall into one of three categories: something
you have (e.g. software tokens), something you are (e.g. biometrics), or something you
know (e.g. passwords). While passwords are the most common form of authentication
currently researchers have been investigating alternate forms of authentication that
may replace them.
The main principle behind the “something you have” form of authentication in-
volves giving the user something to use to authenticate themselves as needed. This
can come in many forms such as identification cards [22] or software tokens [91]. The
user is not required to remember any secret like they have to with passwords, they
just use their authentication item as needed.
In 2002, Chien et al. [23] proposed an authentication scheme using identification
cards. These cards may or may not have an associated password with them (e.g. a
building access card versus a debit card with a PIN), but the card itself acts as an
important tool in the authentication process. The identification card is designed to
have authenticating information for the user on it. Even with an associated password
with the identification card, the memory strain on the user is reduced as there is only
a single password associated with the card.
On the other hand, security tokens were proposed in a patent by Weiss [91]. The
patent describes a device used to calculate non-predictable codes. These codes are
generated by a fixed variable, which acts as an identifier for a user, and at least
one dynamic variable, which acts as a random addition to affect the result (e.g. the
time of day of the request for authentication). This results in periodically changing,
verifiable identification codes which are unique to a given user. While these tokens
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seem incredibly strong, if the fixed variable is somehow leaked then the identifiers are
easily bypassed, an event famously seen in the past with SecurID [16].
The “something you are” form of authentication, commonly referred to as Bio-
metrics, leverage physical aspects of a user to authenticate. This can include aspects
such as the user’s fingerprint [72], iris [28], or even face [47]. In contrast to passwords,
biometrics don’t require users to recall anything and instead take information from
the user that the user inherently has.
Fingerprint recognition authentication often store minor details or imperfections
from a fingerprint, called minutiae, removing the requirement to store the raw fin-
gerprint image [72] as these minutiae are claimed to be unique across individuals.
Despite these claims, there are some major issues with fingerprint authentication.
Matsumoto et al. [62] discussed the impact of targeted attacks on fingerprint systems
using artificial, or “gummy”, fingers. They created false fingers out of gelatin, using
molds of their own fingers, and discovered extremely high rates of success unlocking
systems with these gelatin fingers. Furthermore, they recreated fingerprints from fin-
gerprints left on glass surfaces with similar results. These results are troubling if a
specific user is targeted by an attacker.
Ross et al. [72] pushed these vulnerabilities even further by demonstrating how
to reconstruct a fingerprint using minutiae data. While they do not reconstruct
fingerprints in their entirety, they discussed the information that would be required
to do so. Further discussion emphasized how reconstructed fingerprints could be used
to create synthetic fingerprints which could compromise the authentication system.
Unlike passwords, when a user’s fingerprint gets stolen it cannot be replaced easily
to re-establish security.
Iris recognition has also been suggested as a form of authentication. An alternate
work by Ma et al. [59] demonstrates how the texture of the iris can be examined in
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order to authenticate a user. Their method is surprisingly effective when handling a
variety of low quality images, such as images with motion blur or severely obstructed
by eyelashes and/or eyelids. These textures are, like fingerprints, believed to be
unique to a person, even between identical twins.
Work by Daugman [28] improves on this concept by focusing on the shape features
of the iris, which are quickly and easily gathered from an image. Random charac-
teristics and irregular details are shown to be better represented than by the texture
features used by Ma et al. [59]. The accuracy of scanning an iris has been found to be
relatively high and has also been similarly shown to work on low quality or unfocused
images of the iris.
A user’s face has been shown to also be used for authentication. Jain et al. [47]
discussed methods for detecting and analyzing faces from images or video. Facial
recognition schemes tend to follow one of two different approaches: identifying the
location of prominent facial features such as eyes, nose, and mouth or an overall
analysis of the face as a weighted combination of images from a facial database.
However, Jain et al. [47] discuss how their work is currently only suitable for certain
appearances as it cannot interpret new appearances, such as a different facial angle
or expression, unseen in training.
However these are just a few of the many different types of biometric authen-
tication. Jain et al. [48] and later Bhattacharyya et al. [11] discussed an overview
of many different types of biometric authentication, as well as some limitations of
the technology at the time. They both discuss how biometrics seem to be a perfect
solution to the fundamental issues of passwords, poor accuracy could provide a false
positive authentication (e.g. facial recognition between identical twins) or false neg-
ative authentication (e.g. poor quality prints from a finger cannot be matched) are
major concerns. Furthermore, there are high privacy risks for users in the case of a
16
data breach of biometric information as biometrics cannot be changed or replaced.
While passwords are dominant in the “something you know” authentication form,
other forms exist as well such as graphical passwords [94], video passwords , or ge-
ographic authentication [79]. These schemes generally require the user and the au-
thentication system to share a secret with each other, which the user must remember
to authenticate in the future.
While there are a number of different types of graphical password authentica-
tion schemes, Wiedenbeck’s PassPoints [94] have received a fair amount of attention.
Graphical passwords require a user to click on different points on an image, those
points acting as their password. These schemes take advantage of the image in ques-
tion acting as a “cue” for a password, as well as the fact that studies have shown
that images are easier to recall than words [67, 75]. PassPoints itself improves on
previous graphical password schemes by allowing any image and, more impactfully,
altering how the image is discretized by using three grids instead of one. By using
three grids, one can be assured that every possible click a user makes will be safely
within the bounds of a square of at least one of the grids. However, it has been
demonstrated that many images have common points that users will click on [80],
drastically reducing the security of such a technique. Further work by van Oorschot
et al. [84] introduced fully automated attacks on PassPoints demonstrating unseen
vulnerabilities in the authetication.
Geographic passwords, such as Thorpe et al.’s GeoPass [79], use geographic loca-
tion as an important aspect of authentication. GeoPass [79] requires users to choose a
geographic location on a map and that chosen location becomes their password. Sim-
ilar to graphical passwords, geographic passwords take advantage of cues and image
recognition, except the “image” in this case is a map. While authentication errors
were rare with GeoPass, it is susceptible to social engineering attacks. MacRae et
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al. [60] expanded on the work of Thorpe et al. [79] and developed GeoPassNotes. This
system requires both a location and an annotation with increased security compared
to GeoPass without a significant loss in memorability. Addas et al. [6,7] implemented
geographic data both to aid in the memorability of passwords in a system known as
GeoHints [7] and in a fallback authentication system called GeoSQ [6].
Despite research into alternative authentication schemes, passwords remain a dom-
inant form of authentication in the wild. It appears replacing passwords isn’t quite as
simple as coming up with a new form of authentication. Bonneau et al. [15] analyzed
and created a framework for comparing different authentication schemes. With this
framework, they explain major factors in why it is so difficult to replace passwords.
Some main strengths of passwords include their simplicity in implementation and fa-
miliarity to users. Many of the other authentication schemes in this comparison only
offer minor improvements over passwords and therefore have little hope of replacing
them.
2.4 Password Policies
With passwords here to stay, some have been looking for ways to improve the strength
of the passwords that users create during the time of creation. One large branch of
research in this field belongs to the study of password composition policies, or simply
password policies. Password policies restrict the passwords that users can create by
imposing rules they must abide by for a password to be accepted [77]. A policy
may include such rules as a minimum length requirement or requiring numbers and
uppercase letters. The goal of these rules is to prevent users from creating the weakest
of passwords.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of password composition policies, Campbell et
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al. [18] compared how passwords created with a password policy compared against
those without. The passwords created under the enforcement of a password policy
were notably different from dictionary words, implying a greater resistance against
a dictionary attack against such passwords. Campbell et al. [19] later demonstrated
this increased resistance.
Despite the purpose of password policies, they have been shown to have their own
issues. The works by Campbell et al. [18,19] each discuss how the use of password poli-
cies does not discourage the use of personal information in passwords. Furthermore,
they discuss how users find the passwords created under the enforcement of pass-
word policies are considered more difficult to remember. A user study by Inglesant et
al. [46] demonstrated poor habits that arose in response to restrictive password poli-
cies. Users expressed frustration towards complex password policies and confirmed
the results from Campbell et al. [18,19] that the passwords created under such restric-
tions were far less memorable. Despite users understanding of secure password habits,
users used insecure techniques in order to remember the passwords they created such
as writing their password down.
There are a number of negative user behaviours when it comes to creating pass-
words. A study by Campbell et al. [20] demonstrated how even highly restrictive
policies don’t reduce the amount of personal information users put in their passwords
and how simple coping strategies are often used to get around restrictions. Further-
more, a number of users reported that the password they created was at the very
least similar to other passwords they have, to aid in memorability of their password.
Recently, a password policy by Guo et al. [40] was designed to help increase the
memorability of passwords while also having the structure of a restrictive policy. This
policy combines the restrictiveness of overly restrictive policies with the memorability
of keyboard patterns and images. The policy requires at least 8 characters and char-
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acters from at least 3 of the 4 character classes, which is typically considered a strong
policy, but also requests the user draw a picture on their keyboard to follow for key
presses. Users perceived the passwords they created with the Optiwords policy to be
both comparably strong to a random password, but also comparably memorable to a
simple 8-character password.
Komanduri et al. [56] performed a large-scale study to investigate password strength
and user behaviour in the presence of different password composition policies. They
discovered that while stricter policies do result in users creating stronger passwords,
there was also a significant increase in negative user behaviours. Examples of these
behaviours include reusing passwords, coming up with simple coping strategies (such
as appending a ‘!’), confirming the results from Campbell et al. [20]. Their study
however found previously non-discussed negative behaviours, such as simply giving
up on creating a password. Despite all the negative results from restrictive password
policies, Komanduri et al. [56] did demonstrate that adding a restriction blocking
dictionary words from passwords noticeably increased the strength of the passwords
without adding negative behaviours.
This decrease in usability is likely why many large social-media websites choose
to have less restrictive policies, as observed by Florencio et al. [35]. These websites
are in a competitive market and desire users to be able to access them easily, which
means allowing for easy to remember passwords. This is a concerning trend however
as large social-media websites are some of the most attacked and breached websites.
In general, we sites that accepted advertising, purchase sponsored links and where
the user has a choice showed strong inverse correlation with password policy strength.
Websites that don’t exist in competitive markets, such as government or university
websites, could afford the poor usability of a restrictive password policy, and often
do have them as a result.
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With all of the usability issues with restrictive password policies, it is little wonder
why the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been relaxing
their recommendations over the years [17, 33, 70]. The cost of restrictive policies to
users is just too great, especially as the number of accounts that users manage tends
to increase as time goes on. While it is still recommended to have a password policy,
to prevent incredibly weak passwords such as 3 character passwords, the general
recommendations are much more relaxed. However, this still leaves us with the issue
of how to convince users to create stronger passwords.
2.5 Password Meters
A second large branch in the research of proactively increasing password strength is
the study of password strength meters, or just password meters. Password meters
attempt to proactively measure the approximate strength of the password a user
inputs to inform them if they have a weak password. If users can see how weak their
password is hopefully they will adapt and create stronger passwords. Furthermore,
it is believed that interacting with a password meter gives users the opportunity to
discover what does and doesn’t make a strong password through experimentation.
It has been shown by Ur et al. [82] that the presence of a password meter does
promote users to create stronger passwords when compared to no meter at all. Their
study compared a number of different password meters as well and how password
creation was affected. The presence of a password meter increased the length of
passwords compared to no meter, but the differences in visualization of the meter did
not cause any significant change. While passwords created using a more stringent
meter were shown to be both longer and contained more character classes, users also
expressed more frustration with the meter compared to the others. Furthermore,
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the presence of a password meter caused users to create stronger passwords, but the
most stringent password meters created the strongest passwords. The only password
meter with negative results was the text feedback only password meter, implying
that a visual component is important in how users understand the strength of their
password.
Despite the promising results of this study, unfortunately it has been shown that
most meters used in practice don’t accurately reflect how resistant the password is to
being guessed. To demonstrate this, de Carné de Carnavalet and Mannan [29] studied
11 prominent web service providers from a number of different categories. Different
meters are shown to give inconsistent strength scores to the same password which may
likely cause confusion for users if their password is given a wide variety of strength
scores. Furthermore, several meters gave high strength scores to relatively common
and easy to guess passwords. Even if a password is labeled as weak, in most meters
it can be trivially modified (e.g. using ‘L33T’ modifications) to obtain the highest
strength rating. Many of these meters use simple heuristics to determine the strength
of passwords, which can be overcome easily if you can determine the heuristics in use.
Part of the work in the large-scale password study by Ji et al. [51] (discussed in
Section 2.2) also investigated the accuracy of password meters. Their results compli-
ment the results of de Carné de Carnavalet [29], demonstrating how many passwords
which are classified as strong or good strength are still vulnerable to current guessing
techniques. The differences between strength score and actual password strength is
feared to cause a user to be overconfident in the strength of their password. They
also discuss how different meters output different strength scores for passwords, which
could be confusing for users. Recent developments in password meter research fo-
cus on non-heuristic approaches, though a more advanced heuristics-based password
strength meter [93] has also shown much promise.
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The password meter known as zxcvbn was first presented by Dropbox back in
2012 [92], but Wheeler [93] published an improved version later in 2016. Despite being
a heuristics-based password meter, Wheeler [93] applied advanced heuristics to ensure
that zxcvbn displayed the strength of a password more accurately than commonly used
meters. The meter assumes an attacker knows the pattern of a password and attempts
to approximate how many guesses it would take for an attacker to guess the password
with that knowledge. He compared the results of the meter against commonly used
password guessers in research at the time to demonstrate the accuracy of his results.
Between these results and the relatively low resource requirements of the guesser, it is
little wonder why the interest in this meter has steadily increased over the years [71].
Heuristics aren’t the only explored method for estimating password strength.
Standard Markov modeling techniques have been used by Castelluccia et al. [21]
to create an adaptive password strength meter. This was done by generating n-grams
for each new password added to the database, with some additional noise for security.
The probability of the password being guessed is then calculated using the n-gram
database and that acts as the score for the password. As more passwords are added
to the database, the n-gram database generates a more accurate distribution. The
noise added does reduce the accuracy, but increases the security for the passwords in
the case that the n-gram database is leaked.
A password guess number calculator was introduced by Kelley et al. [52] which
determines if and when a given password guessing algorithm, trained on a given
password training set, would guess a given password. This guess number calculator
had two implementations, a brute-force Markov (BFM) model and a PCFG model.
The BFM model could calculate the guess number by ordering the probabilities of
one character following another. The PCFG model created a lookup table (capped
at 50 trillion guesses) to calculate the guess number. The lookup table was both
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time and space intensive to make, but the PCFG algorithm outperformed BFM in
all cases. Training data choice showed significant effect on guessing passwords for
stronger password policy but showed less impact for weak password policies. Adding
the Openwall dictionary to the training actually decreased the guessing speed for
certain password policies. Passwords created under a certain policy had a different
guess resistance compared to passwords selected from a different group that met the
rules of that policy.
A large-scale study on a feedback driven password meter by Ur et al. [81] was
performed to test the effects of the meter on password creation. Twenty-one heuristics
were used to evaluate a password and provide written feedback to the user on ways
to improve. The neural network from Melicher et al. [64] (discussed in Section 2.6)
was used to simulate an attacker on the passwords for determining how far to fill the
password strength bar. They found that their feedback meter greatly improved the
strength of passwords created in a weaker password policy, however it was shown that
there was not a significant improvement for passwords created in a stronger password
policy.
Another aspect to the work by Ji et al. [50] (discussed in Section 2.2 was to
measure the strength of passwords using personal information, called SocialShield.
SocialShield was designed to assist users in creating passwords unrelated to their so-
cial profile and thus creating more secure passwords. While SocialShield was designed
to be able to quantify the correlation between a password and the user’s profile infor-
mation it was considered unethical to crawl users’ profiles online using their leaked
email information so SocialShield was only tested on username and email data. Still,
by comparing the strength of leaked passwords using SocialShield to simulated attacks
using personal information against these passwords in their experiments, they demon-
strated how the accuracy and effectiveness of measuring the strength of passwords
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with SocialShield.
When created correctly, password meters provide users with both a learning tool
and a guide for creating stronger passwords. This is likely why, anecdotally, I find
their use becoming more and more widespread in web services over the years. They
influence users to generate stronger passwords without causing as much frustration
as password policies as they are suggestions rather than rules. This allows websites
that exist in competitive markets to increase the security of their users without the
usability issues encountered with restrictive password policies.
2.6 Password Guessers
Password policies and password meters attempt to increase the strength of the pass-
words that users make against attacks from a malicious attacker. The main issue
with this concept is that we do not know what methods attackers use to guess pass-
words. The safest guess we have is that attackers use the best methods and the most
resources possible in these attacks, and to keep up with this idea, researchers create
their own password guessers in an attempt to stay at least on par with attackers. If
malicious attackers end up using researcher’s technology then at least we should have
an accurate understanding of their capabilities.
Using Markov models to guess passwords was first implemented by Narayan et
al. [66] back in 2005. Markov modeling techniques from Natural Language Processing
were used to reduce the size of the password space to be searched. This took advantage
of the fact that the distribution of letters and adjacent letters in weak passwords are
likely to be similar to the distribution of letters in the the users’ native language. This
attack used regular dictionaries as well as rules for common patterns and modifications
of passwords to increase their coverage of the plausible password space. This method
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cracked 67.6% of the passwords from Passware, a vast improvement over the Rainbow
attack’s 27.5%, which was the fastest password guessing technique at the time.
A number of variants to the standard Markov model technique for password crack-
ing were later introduced by Ma et al. [58]. These variants include differing by order
for Markov chains and approaches to smoothing among other distinctions. These
variations were all tested in different training/testing scenarios where different com-
binations of datasets were used for training and testing. The datasets used were
RockYou, Yahoo, PhpBB, Duduniu, 178, and CSDN. Different variants performed
better in the different situations. The backoff model with end-symbol normalization
performed the best overall among all scenarios. For most models, distribution-based
normalization outperformed all other normalizations, except in the case of the back-
off model. For English datasets, order-5 Markov chain model performed the best but
with Chinese datasets order-3 and order-4 often outperform order-5.
Dürmuth et al. [31] proposed further improvements to the standard Markov mod-
elling technique. The main contribution to their technique, called the Ordered Markov
Enumerator (OMEN), is the fact it outputs passwords in decreasing order of prob-
ability. By making this change, the most likely passwords will be selected first for
guessing. Their algorithm is adaptive, keeping track of the success rates of different
password lengths and favoring the password lengths that are more frequent. OMEN
has significantly improved guessing speed and accuracy when compared to John the
Ripper and a PCFG password guesser.
Weir et al. [90] first described a method of guessing passwords using PCFGs.
A training set of passwords is first decomposed into structures. These structures
break the passwords down into representations of sequences of characters separated
by character type. The three character types they use are letters, digits, and symbols
which are represented by L, D, and S respectively. These structures are ordered in
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decreasing probability of their occurrence, then used for password guessing. The
method managed to crack between 28% to 129% more passwords on the MySpace
dataset when compared to John the Ripper. This technique is also one that many
future password guessing techniques compare themselves against and acts as a basis
for other guessers.
Veras et al. [85] implemented Natural Language Processing techniques in order to
create a framework for analysis of the semantic patterns in passwords. This knowledge
is then used to generate password guesses in offline attack scenarios more efficiently
than other approaches at the time by building upon previous work in PCFGs. This
method has a longer run time than expected which requires further study to detect
where this issue originates from. The guessing technique also has increased memory
consumption compared to other approaches. Despite these losses, the semantic ap-
proach managed to guess over 67% more passwords from the LinkedIn leak and 32%
more passwords from the MySpace leak when compared to both PCFGs and John
the Ripper.
More recently, recurrent neural networks have been used by Melicher et al. [64] in
order to guess passwords which work as well or better than many current approaches
to password guessing. While the neural network can be used as a standard password
guesser, a main strength of it is in password strength estimation. The neural network
uses Monte Carlo simulations to quickly and relatively accurately calculate the guess
number of a password, which Ur et al. [81] implemented in their password meter
(described in Section 2.5). They demonstrated the strength of the neural network as
a password guessed by comparing it against typically studied password guessers (e.g.
PCFGs, John the Ripper). The neural network outperformed all other guessers after
around 1010 guesses and matched the other methods before that point.
Deep learning has been used by Hitaj et al. [43] to create a Generative Adver-
27
sarial Network (GAN) called PassGAN. This technique differed from the Recurrent
Neural Network created by Melicher et al. [64]. Each guesser in their experiments
was tuned, if possible, to guess the passwords of the testing datasets as effectively
as possible, using prior knowledge of the datasets. PassGAN however does not use
prior knowledge or tuning to generate optimal passwords. Despite this lack of tuning,
PassGAN performed comparably to the state-of-the-art guessers in their experiments.
Furthermore, PassGAN was shown to be able to guess an incredibly high number of
guesses compared to other guessers they studied (e.g. Hashcat, Weir’s PCFG).
Ur et al. [83] compared the best practices at the time between John the Ripper
(JtR), Hashcat, PCFGs, Markov models, and a professional password cracker from
KoreLogic. This research differed from earlier findings that often used stock con-
figurations for comparison between guessers. Markov and PCFG approaches often
outperformed JtR and Hashcat early on. Hashcat and JtR often showed rapid im-
provements in guessing after 1010 guesses. Due to large resource requirements, the
Markov technique could not make more than 109 guesses. The professional allowed
their method to run for 1013 guesses before adding freestyle rules based on results.
This produced a large increase in guessing effectiveness unseen in all of the automated
techniques and in the end were more successful than any of the automated guessers.
2.7 Literature Gap
We note that system administrators need to make many decisions to implement ef-
fective password checking. These decisions include which subset of guessing tools to
choose among many available options, how to train them, which training dataset to
choose, etc. To support these decisions, the literature falls short in systematically
understanding guesser behaviours and their ability to compliment or substitute one
28
another. This work attempts to address this gap. We focus on developing metrics
and statistics to aid understanding password guessers (both present and future), to
facilitate the work and decision making of administrators for password checking.
With begin with inspiration from the work of Ji et al. [50] in calculating the
similarity between training and testing datasets. We decided to take their work
further and create a framework to investigate how and why password guessers create
the guesses they do. Calculating the similarity between modified features or exact
passwords in a variety of situations we can begin an in-depth investigation of how
password guessers are the same, and how they might be different. From this point,
instead of creating our own traditional password guesser we demonstrate how to these
metrics can be used to identify guessers that show promise when used together. With
these results, we find low-resource password guessers that demonstrate comparable
results to state-of-the art guessers used in research today. This work is designed to




Our primary objective is to gain a deeper understanding of password guesser be-
haviour by comparing the actual password guesses produced by each guesser across
pairs of real-world testing and training password datasets. To accomplish this we
must devise methods of objectively comparing and analyzing this behaviour. We be-
gin by defining common notation used in our metrics. Following this, we describe
how we extract structural features from passwords for use in structural analysis and
describe the statistics we use to compare two password lists. Finally, we describe the
different statistics and how we use them in our analysis.
We consider a set of m password guessers G = {g1, . . . , gm} where each gi repre-
sents a specific guesser (e.g., John the Ripper, OMEN, etc.). By ensuring G includes
diverse and powerful set of guessers, we aim to understand how each guesser behaves
when trained on or tested against particular password datasets, what types of pass-
words they guess, and how similar one guesser’s behaviour is to others. To this end,
each guesser g ∈ G will be trained on and tested against a set of n password datasets
D = {D1, ..., Dn}, where each Dj is a publicly-available password dataset (e.g., Rock-
30
You, Twitter, etc.).1 When a guesser gi ∈ G is trained on a dataset Dj ∈ D, it
can create a list of password guesses Lij. To compare various guessers trained on
various datasets, we extract (structural) features from Lij, and develop some metrics
and statistics. To achieve this, we first define our features on each password, then
aggregate them for the list of passwords, and then compare the aggregated features.
3.1 Password Features
For each password w, we extract two structural features: password length nw (i.e., the
number of its characters) and the number of character classes cw that it contains. We
focus on four distinct character classes: lowercase letters, uppercase letters, numbers,
and symbols. For instance, w = passw0rd! has nw = 9 and cw = 3 with three
character classes of lowercase letter, number, and symbol.
To extract features from password list L′ (e.g., leaked password database or guess
list of a guesser), we first aggregate the extracted features of all w ∈ L′ into a matrix
V = [vxy] where vxy is the fraction of passwords in password list L
′ which contains y






1[cw = x & nw = y], (3.1)
where 1[.] is the indicator function, and |L′| represents the number of passwords in
the list.2 The matrix V has a natural probability interpretation: when one selects a
password w from the password list L′ uniformly at random, the password w contains
y characters from x character classes with a probability of vxy. In other words,
our matrix V captures the joint probability distribution of passwords over character
1We use the terminology of “testing against a dataset” when a guesser is guessing the passwords
of a target password dataset.
2Indicator function 1[s] returns 1 if the statement s is true; otherwise 0.
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classes and the number of characters.
For example, let’s assume we have a password list L=[‘abc’, ‘abc1’, ‘1qw’, ‘pass’,
‘abc’, ‘1234’, ‘qwe’]. These passwords fall into the following categories:
cw = 1 & nw = 3 cw = 1 & nw = 4 cw = 2 & nw = 3 cw = 2 & nw = 4
abc pass 1qw abc1
abc 1234
qwe
which results in the following matrix V :
V =

0 0 3/7 2/7
0 0 1/7 1/7
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

We converted all of our password lists into 4 by 50 matrices by grouping all
passwords with a length of 50 or more into a 50+ length group, placing each password
in one combination between 4 character class categories and 50 length categories. To
ease our notations and analyses, we collapse (i.e., flatten) the matrix V into a 200-
dimensional feature vector v. We refer to this feature vector as the structural features
of a password list. This simple representation allow us to preserve the impact of
password policies of each password list.
3.2 Statistics
Our metrics for comparing two password lists (e.g., leaked datasets or guess lists) use
either the structural features (discussed above) or the passwords shared between two
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lists. Our deployed metrics have been widely used in information retrieval [9, 37, 76],
data mining [10,30], and other password research [50].
3.2.1 Cosine Similarity
Cosine similarity measures the angle between two non-zero vectors. For comparison
of two password lists, one can extract structural features from each list, and then
use the cosine similarity on the corresponding feature vectors. The cosine similarity





where vA and vB are structural feature vectors of A and B, respectively. ‖.‖ is the
Euclidean norm, and vA · vB is the dot product of those two vectors. The closer the
cosine similarity value is to 1, the smaller the angle between the two vectors is, and
the more similar they are. In other words, two lists of passwords with similar feature
distributions have a high cosine similarity. As with Ji et al. [50], we apply our method-
ology to compare pairs of password datasets. By doing so, in our experiments, we
show how various leaked password datasets compare to each other in their structural
characteristics. While Ji et al. also applied cosine similarity to their feature vectors,
our chosen features differ from theirs. We chose to focus on character classes and
password length as the basis for our features to allow for a straight-forward compar-
ison with a system’s password policy. One can easily see the presence of a password
policy (e.g., 12 characters, 1 digit, 1 symbol) in our vectors, and readily compare
them to those of different datasets or guess lists. In practice, this would allow a sys-
tem administrator to immediately compare a prospective training dataset with their
own system’s policy in a more clean fashion than is possible with other features (e.g.,
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n-grams, grammar structures, dictionaries).
3.2.2 Jaccard Index
Jaccard index measures the extent two sets overlap with each other, where the in-
tersection of two sets is compared to their union. The Jaccard index between two





The closer the Jaccard index is to 1, the closer in size the intersection of the sets is
to their union, and consequently the more similar two sets are. In other words, the
two sets of passwords with high amounts of overlap will have a high Jaccard index.
The Jaccard index also has a natural probabilistic interpretation: if one chooses a
password uniformly at random from either password lists, the Jaccard index captures
the likelihood of selecting a password belonging to both sets. One can utilize this
same methodology for comparing two password datasets. In our experiments, we use
Jaccard similarity to investigate how passwords in various password datasets compare
to each other (or specifically, overlap with each other).
3.2.3 Generalized Jaccard Index
When password lists have duplicates (e.g., leaked password datasets), we view the
password list as a multiset, a modification of sets that allows for duplicated elements.
In these cases, we apply a generalized version of the Jaccard index [50] to preserve the
frequency information of password duplicates in password lists (e.g., comparing raw
leaked datasets) which works on vectors which take into account both the frequency of
repetition and overlap instead of on sets. In this form the index compares two equally
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sized vectors composed of the number of occurrences of each password found in the
union of passwords between the two sets. This version allows for a more accurate
comparison of datasets with duplicates when compared with converting the datasets
to sets and using the canonical Jaccard Index. Letting f(w,A) be the number of
occurrences of password w in password list A, the generalized Jaccard index between
two password lists A and B is given by
J(A,B) =
∑
w∈U min (f(w,A), f(w,B))∑
w∈U max (f(w,A), f(w,B))
, (3.4)
where U = A ∪B.
As both the cosine similarity and the Jaccard index are symmetric, they are
computed once for each pair of password lists.
Our comparison metrics can be readily used for the comparison of a pair of pass-
word lists generated by two guessers. However, to compare two guessers thoroughly,
one requires some statistics to summarize the comparison metrics of two guessers un-
der many different settings (e.g., under different training and testing datasets). This
section explains our proposed statistics for summarizing comparison metrics. Our
statistics fall into two categories.
3.3 Guessing Success Statistics
The guessing success statistics quantify the guessing accuracy of guessers under var-
ious settings (e.g., training and testing datasets), and also determine how training
data affects guessing success for various guessers.
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3.3.1 Success Rate
When each guesser gi is trained on password dataset Dj and tested against password






where Lij is the password guess list created by guesser gi when trained on password
dataset Dj. Note that sijk ∈ [0, 1], where sijk = 1 implies that all passwords in Dk
are guessed successfully by gi trained on Dj. This is the commonly used comparison
between guessers in literature. From this point, we branched out to understand
different ways success rate is affected by different circumstances.
3.3.2 Guesser Success Rate
To summarize the success rate for a specific guesser gi, one can compute its mean









We also calculate the standard deviation of the success rate for a specific guesser








(sijk − 〈si::〉)2 (3.7)
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3.3.3 Training Success Rate










3.3.4 Fixed Success Rate








3.4 Guessing Behaviour Statistics
This class of statistics are devised to either compare the guessing behaviours of pass-
word guessers with each other, or measure how different training datasets affect the
guessing behaviour of a given guesser.
3.4.1 Guessing Similarity
Our guessing similarity statistic summarizes the similarity of two guessers’ guess lists
when trained on the same dataset by averaging the comparison metric (e.g, Jaccard
or Cosine) of their guess lists over various training datasets. We calculate the guessing







where M ∈ {C, J} is either Cosine similarity (see Eq. 3.2) or Jaccard index (see
Eq. 3.3), and Lik is the list of password guesses (without any duplicates) generated by
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gi trained on datasets Dk. Here, n is the number of datasets in D. We also introduce









M (Lik ∩D`, Ljk ∩D`) . (3.11)
3.4.2 Training Similarity
One might be interested in measuring how similarly two different password datasets
can train guessers. To this end, we introduce our training similarity statistic which
calculates the extent two different training password datasets result in generating
similar guess lists of passwords when used for training. We define training similarity
between two datasets Dj and Dk by






where m is the number of different guessers in G. This formula computes how similarly
Dj andDk can train guessers on average. By capturing the extent two various datasets
are effectively similar in training guessers, one can identify training datasets which
are as effective as another dataset in training guessers. This could be used to identify
effective, yet small datasets, which could drastically speed up the training process.
3.4.3 Training Independence
To investigate how sensitive each guesser’s output is to the choice of training data, we
introduce the training independence statistic. This statistic is computed by averaging
the comparison metrics (Jaccard or Cosine) between of all pairs of password guess
lists created by the same guesser but with different training datasets. We formally










where n is the number of datasets in D, and M ∈ {J,C}. This formula computes,
on average, how similar two password guess lists generated by guesser gi are, when
trained on two different password datasets. As this value approaches 1, password
guess lists become more similar, regardless of the choice of training data. A password
guesser with a training independence value of 1 doesn’t learn from the training data
as it always generates the same guesses despite the choice of training dataset (e.g.,
a brute force attack). A guesser with a very low training independence value would
not generalize effectively beyond the training data (e.g., JtR-Wordlist mode with no
rules). It should be noted that a training independence of 0 would be possible for




Our experiments are designed to enhance our understanding of different password
guesser’s behaviour when we vary the training and testing datasets and when each
tool is used to complete different password guessing tasks. In particular, we aim to
understand how each guesser performs when attacking different password datasets
with varied training data (e.g., varied cross dataset similarity and training dataset
size), what types of passwords they generate, how similar their guesses are to each
other, and how this changes in online and offline attack scenarios. To this end, we
choose a variety of different password guessers and password datasets.
4.1 Comparison Resources
We design our experiments to enhance our understanding of different password guessers’
behaviour when we vary the training and testing datasets. To this end, we first choose
a variety of different password guessers and password datasets.
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Number of Passwords
Datasets Total Unique Ratio Type
ClixSense [39] 2,222,359 1,628,205 0.7326 Plaintext
Webhost [36] 15,292,021 10,589,775 0.6925 Plaintext
Mate1 [73] 27,403,932 11,988,154 0.4375 Plaintext
RockYou [24] 32,596,319 14,337,716 0.4399 Plaintext
Fling [26] 40,769,652 16,810,091 0.4123 Plaintext
Twitter [27] 40,872,901 22,579,065 0.5524 Plaintext
Merged* 159,157,184 77,933,006 0.4897 Plaintext
LinkedIn [41] 174,243,105 61,829,207 0.3548 Hashed
Table 4.1: The password datasets, their sizes, and the ratio between unique and total
number of passwords. *Merged contains all other plaintext datasets in this table.
4.1.1 Password Datasets
Our experiments use a variety of publicly available leaked password datasets, which
have been the subject of other password research studies (for example, [25,38,86,87,
89,96]). We have curated and cleaned these datasets by converting their passwords to
Unicode. Table 4.1 shows the number of total and unique passwords in each dataset
as well as the ratio between those values.1
Fling. This password dataset is from an adult dating website Fling, which suffered
from a data breach in 2011 [26]. For most of the time before the leak, Fling required
passwords to have at least one digit (though all digit passwords are allowed).
ClixSense. The online survey website ClixSense was attacked in 2016 [39]. It is our
smallest dataset with only 2.2 million passwords. By training on this small password
set, we can begin to see how guessers trained on small datasets perform when tested
against larger testing sets.
1We exclusively use publicly available datasets and don’t report any specific password informa-
tion. Thus, there is no risk of exposing private user information. We keep only the passwords with
no links to their original owner.
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Twitter. This dataset, created in 2016 from credentials harvested from users of the
social media website Twitter, is our largest individual dataset with over 40 million
passwords [27].
Webhost. The web hosting site 000webhost suffered a breach in 2015 [36]. This
dataset, with 15 million passwords, has a more complicated password policy than
other password datasets. Also, its users were generally more tech savvy (e.g., system
administrators) than average users of social media or dating websites.
Mate1. This dataset is collected from the 2016 breach of the dating website Mate1
[73]. As a result of the breach, 27 million users passwords were leaked.
RockYou. The defunct social media application developer RockYou suffered a data
breach in 2009. RockYou’s password policy only required a length of 5 characters [24].
This large dataset is widely studied in previous work (e.g., [13, 49,55]).
Merged. We create a merged dataset of all of the previous plaintext datasets. This
dataset contains more than 159 million passwords.
LinkedIn. The business-oriented social network website LinkedIn suffered from a
breach in 2012 [41]. This dataset contains 174 million unsalted passwords hashed
with SHA1. We use LinkedIn exclusively as a test dataset when simulating offline
attacks.
4.1.2 Password Guessing Tools
To understand how different password guessers behave, we draw our attention to three
different general classes of password guessers commonly-used in the literature: Markov
models, Probabilistic Context Free Grammars (PCFGs), and Neural Networks. From
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these classes, we select six different password guessers for our studies.
John the Ripper Markov Mode (JtR-Markov). We use its community build (1.9.0-
bleeding-jumbo) [1] in Markov mode. When a guess is generated in Markov mode, its
probability of being guessed is also calculated. To set our cutoff number of guesses,
we set the minimum probability for passwords to be guessed through the Markov
level setting. This allowed us to generate our desired number of passwords.2 We also
restrict the maximum length of passwords to 12 characters, which we determined to
provide the best results and is consistent with other studies [85].3 We pipe these
guesses to a file, which we call a guess list for later evaluation where we use this file
for a wordlist attack. This pipeline strategy is used for all other guessers discussed
below. JtR runs single-threaded during both training and guessing.
Ordered Markov Enumerator (OMEN). We use OMEN [3,31] with the default settings.
OMEN produces only ASCII passwords and runs single-threaded during training
and guessing. OMEN [3, 31] applies a Markov approach to password generation and
outputs guesses in probability order to improve guessing speed. OMEN uses training
data to estimate probabilities for different n-grams and lengths of passwords. We
use the default 72 character alphabet and n-grams of size 4 while applying additive
smoothing. Instead of determining a probability cutoff, there is built-in functionality
to choose a guess cutoff value, which we set to match the cutoff of other guessers.
OMEN produces only ASCII passwords and runs single-threaded during training and
guessing.
Probabilistic Context-Free Grammar (PCFGv4). We used PCFG version 4.0 [4], which
is an extension of the original Weir et al. PCFG [90] that includes enhancements
2We use the command ./genmkvpwd statfile 0 12 to determine the Markov level required to
generate the number of guesses we need.
3We use the command ./john –markov=Number:0:0:12 –stdout where Number is replaced with
the Markov level determined by the genmkvpwd command.
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proposed by Houshmand et al. [44]. A notable enhancement is its use of OMEN to
generate a certain percentage of passwords and generate the remainder with PCFGs.
In our experiments, we disable this feature and generate passwords exclusively from
PCFGv4 (i.e., learnt grammars) as the use of OMEN decreased the success rate of
the guesser significantly in online attacks at 1 million guesses and caused a minor
decrease in offline attacks.4 PCFGv4 runs single-threaded for training and guessing.
Semantic Guesser (Sem). Sem [85] is a PCFG-based password guessing tool that
incorporates part-of-speech tags and word semantics in the password grammars. We
use the lite and database-free version of Sem [5,85]. The grammars are trained using
maximum likelihood estimation, the backoff algorithm is used for producing tags, and
mangling rules are enabled for generating guesses. Similar to OMEN, this guesser has
built-in functionality for choosing a guess cutoff value. The deadbeat algorithm [88] is
used for generating guesses and the mangle option is used. Sem uses multiprocessing
with all available CPUs during training, but runs single threaded for guessing.
Neural Network (NN). We generate guesses using “human” mode of NN [2, 64]. The
generated passwords are sorted in a descending order of their probabilities. We limit
the length of passwords to be between six and forty characters with “basic” policy
enforcement. Like OMEN, the NN filters non-ascii passwords during training and
it produces only ASCII passwords. Because of our large datasets, we use a larger
model than the original paper, consisting of three LSTM layers (with 1024 neurons
each) and two dense layers (with 512 neurons each), which outperformed the original
model in our preliminary tests. We use a context length of 10, a train/test ratio of
80:20, and backwards training option. We train each model with Adam [54] for five
generations. The neural network is our only guesser that uses GPU resources along
4The command “python3 trainer.py -r name -t training data -e utf-8” was used for training where
the name is the file name for learnt parameters (i.e., grammars) and training data is the location of
the password list to train on.
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with CPU. The neural network runs multi-threaded during training and guessing.
Identity Guesser (ID). This guesser takes a training dataset as input, removes its
duplicates, and outputs its unique passwords in the descending order of their fre-
quency in the training dataset. In other words, this guesser computes the empirical
probability distribution of the passwords in the training dataset (i.e., training phase),
then outputs the passwords from the highest to the lowest probability (i.e., genera-
tion phase). This simple guesser is a valuable benchmark for understanding how well
other guessers learn and generalize.
For the purposes of guessing passwords we also use one more guesser:
John the Ripper Wordlist Mode. The community build (1.9.0-bleeding-jumbo) [1] of
John the Ripper also has a wordlist mode. In this mode one can provide two inputs,
a password guess list (as either a file or stdin) and a list of passwords to guess, with
each entry in each of the lists separated by new lines. John the Ripper will try each
guess from the guess list, in order, against the passwords in the list to guess. If the
list of passwords to guess is hashed and the hash is known, it can also be provided as
input. If no hash is specified then John the Ripper will attempt to detect the hash
(if any) automatically. John the Ripper outputs both statistics on guessing (number
of successful guesses, duration of guessing, etc.) as well as the list of all passwords
which were successfully guessed. We use this password guesser exclusively for guessing
passwords, and do not compare it’s behaviours to the other guessers.
4.2 Guessing Passwords
In order to compare the behaviours of password guessers, we were required to not
only guess passwords but also gather information such as what the guesses were and
which guesses were successful. To achieve this, we follow a simple procedure for each
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combination of guesser, training data, and testing data as follows:
1. Train the guesser on the chosen training dataset.
2. Save the output guess list of the guesser to a file.
3. Input the guess list and testing data to John the Ripper in wordlist mode.
4. Save the results of the guessing attack and the successful guesses to another set
of files.
With all of this information gathered, we are able to compare guessers in the
following ways.
4.3 Resource Measurements of Password Guessers
To help understand the resource requirements of each guesser, we analyze each guesser’s
runtime during training and guess list creation. Each guesser is trained and generates
guesses on the same GPU-accelerated server which ran no other jobs. The server has
2 Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6148 CPUs with 80 total cores @ 2.40GHz and 4 Nvidia
GeForce 1080 Ti GPUs. Each guesser utilizes available resources to different degrees
based on their approach and implementation. For training, we created two datasets
by sampling 1 million and 50 million passwords from the Merged dataset. For testing,
we have each guesser generate as many passwords as it can, up to 300 million guesses.
4.4 Password Guessing Success
To better understand each guesser on an individual level, we perform a series of
experiments that investigates the behaviour of each guesser (i.e., generated list of
guessed passwords) under various settings (e.g., trained with different datasets or
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with different guess cutoffs). We examine the average success rate of each guesser
across varied training data, testing data, and password guessing scenarios (e.g., online
and offline attacks). We also explore how similar guessers’ guess lists are to each
other. We perform this analysis by applying our metrics and statistics to the guess
lists generated by each guesser under varied settings.
To gauge the average performance of each guesser, we train and test every guesser
on each possible pair of unique training and testing plaintext datasets. We omit the
merged set as it is a composite of other plaintext datasets. We also exclude LinkedIn
as it is hashed and therefore can not be trained on or analyzed in our previous dataset
similarity comparisons. Then, each guesser generates guess lists at cutoffs of 1 million
and 300 million guesses to simulate online and limited offline attacks, respectively,
and calculate the guesser success rate (see Eq. 3.6) of each guesser.
We investigate how guessing success rates are impacted by different aspects of
training datasets such as training dataset size, and the similarity between training
and testing datasets. We also investigate how similarities between password datasets
are preserved in their corresponding password guess lists. To accomplish this, we train
all six password guessers on each of the six individual plaintext datasets and test them
against every other plaintext dataset, yielding 180 password cracking scenarios. For
all guessers, we set the cutoff to 300 million guesses.
We ask whether the success rate of a guesser, on average, increases with the size
of training dataset. To this end we compare the training success (see Eq. 3.8) of each
set of training data to the size of the training data itself. For a formal analysis, we
further calculate the statistical correlation between the number of passwords in the
training dataset and the averaged success rate.
We next focus on how the similarity between training and target datasets impacts
the success rate of guessers. We first compute the cosine similarity and generalized
47
Jaccard index (see Eq. 3.2 and Eq. 3.4) between password datasets, and then explore
the relationship of these similarities with success rates. We further calculate the
statistical correlation between the similarity values and success rates. This is our only
experiment that can be compared with Ji et al.’s [50], in the sense their work computes
similarity using cosine similarity and Jaccard index; however, our features for cosine
similarity differ, and our use of Jaccard index measures overlap of the datasets rather
than overlap of features. Additionally, we use a different set of datasets and guessers.
We explore how similarly two datasets can train a guesser using our notion of
training similarity (see Eq. 3.12). We exclude the Identity guesser due to its simplicity
in learning; also, its results mirror dataset similarity (described above).
4.5 Password Guessing Behaviour
We investigate the behaviour of each guesser (i.e., their generated guess lists) under
various training and target datasets. We also explore how each guesser compliments
and substitutes others.
We use our training independence metric (Eq. 3.13) to study guessers’ sensitivity
to changes in the training dataset. Guessers with high training independence will
produce similar guesses when trained on different datasets. The two extremes of
training independence are a brute-force guesser with the maximum value of 1 and the
identity guesser with the minimum value (not quite 0 due to overlap between training
datasets).
One important characteristic of guessers is how well they can generalize, i.e.,
predict and generate previously unseen passwords. To measure this, we train each
guesser on the Webhost dataset as it is the least similar to the other datasets, both
in terms of structure and actual password overlap (discussed in 5.3.2). We then test
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the Webhost trained guessers against every other dataset and calculate each guesser’s
mean success rate.
We intend to learn how each guesser’s success rate is impacted by the size of
training data, drawn from the same distribution. Sampling from the Twitter dataset,
we create three different datasets of sizes 1 million, 10 million and 30 million. After
training each guesser on each dataset, we generate guess lists at a cutoff of 300M and
test them against all other datasets and report the Fixed Success Rate (see Eq. 3.9).
Using our notion of guessing similarity (see Eq. 3.10), we analyze how similar the
guess lists of two guessers are when they are trained on the same training data. We
investigate the cosine and Jaccard guessing similarity between guessers at cutoffs of
1 million and 300 million guesses.
One might be interested in measuring the uniqueness of successful guesses between
guessers. To achieve this, we use our successful guessing similarity (see Eq. 3.11) with
generalized Jaccard index The generalized Jaccard allows us to weight the successful
guesses of each guesser based on their frequencies in the target dataset.
4.6 Combining Guessers
We evaluate the ability of password guessers to compliment one another on a pre-
viously unseen dataset (i.e., LinkedIn) in an offline attack scenario. We begin by
evaluating each individual guesser against the LinkedIn dataset. Next we analyze
different combinations of guessers.
To compare guessers’ performance, we train each guesser on the Merged dataset,
and allow them to each make 2 billion guesses against the LinkedIn dataset. From
here we calculate the mean success rate of each guesser and apply the findings to
improve the results using combinations of guessers.
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From here, we use our previous analysis to design a combination attack where the
Identity guesser is used to attack a password dataset prior to the application of a set
of other guessers. This hybrid approach exists in John the Ripper where a traditional
John attack follows wordlist mode. We run many independent combination attacks
on LinkedIn, where the Identity guesser precedes a subset of other guessers. Each
guesser is trained on the Merged Dataset and produce two billion guesses. For each
combination attack, we begin with a wordlist attack on LinkedIn using the Identity




To better understand each guesser on an individual level, we perform a series of
experiments that investigates the behaviour of each guesser (i.e., generated list of
guessed passwords) under various settings (e.g., trained with different datasets or
with different guess cutoffs). We compare practical aspects of each guesser including
relative runtime and resource requirements. We also examine the average success
rate of each guesser across varied training data, testing data, and password guessing
scenarios (e.g., online and offline attacks). We also explore how similar guessers’
guess lists are to each other. We perform this analysis by applying our metrics and
statistics to the guess lists generated by each guesser under varied settings.
5.1 Resource Measurements of Password Guessers
Table 5.1 reports guesser training and generation time.1 For each guesser, the training
time increases with the training dataset size. Markov-based and Identity guessers
perform the fastest (< 25 seconds for 50 million), with PCFGs taking longer (about
1Our code for training the identity guesser (i.e., computing empirical distribution of unique
passwords) and its guess generation (i.e., sorting passwords based on their probabilities) is written
in Python without any optimization
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Training
Guesser 1 Million 50 Million Generation
JtR-Markov 00h 00m 00.1s 00d 00h 00m 02.2s 00h 00m 33s
Identity 00h 00m 00.3s 00d 00h 00m 24.9s 00h 00m 18s
OMEN 00h 00m 03.0s 00d 00h 00m 23.0s 00h 07m 10s
Sem 00h 01m 38.3s 00d 00h 20m 14.6s 00h 55m 30s
PCFGv4 00h 03m 49.5s 00d 01h 03m 38.4s 00h 30m 58s
NN 01h 18m 08.0s 02d 17h 01m 49.0s 19h 44m 20s
Table 5.1: Guesser training and generation time. Each dataset is of different size and
randomly sampled from the Merged Dataset. Guessers have generated 300M guesses.
one hour for 50 million) and the neural network taking the longest (more than two
and half days for 50 million). For password generation, we observe that Identity
guesser and Markov models are again by far the fastest. It should be noted that the
Identity guesser only produced approximately 67M guesses, almost 4.5 times fewer
guesses than produced by other guessers. The NN is considerably slower than others:
2100 times slower than JTR-Markov, and even 39 times slower than PCFGv4. We
also note that on top of the high time requirements of NN, it is also our only guesser
which requires GPUs as every other guesser operates using only the CPU.
5.2 Password Guessing Performance
To evaluate the performance of each guesser, we compute the average success rate of
each guesser across varied training data, target data, and password guessing scenarios
(i.e., online and offline attacks).
5.2.1 Impact of Password Guesser Choice
To gauge the average performance of each guesser, we train and test every guesser
on each possible pair of unique training and testing plaintext datasets. We omit the
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Guesser Success Rate@1M Success Rate@300M
Identity 23.238 (11.859) 30.519 (14.079)
JtR-Markov 0.665 (0.993) 27.591 (11.563)
OMEN 5.921 (3.225) 22.121 (10.749)
Sem 18.219 (10.344) 41.343 (13.274)
PCFGv4 23.551 (11.545) 47.397 (12.364)
NN 17.662 (11.585) 40.768 (19.734)
Table 5.2: Guessers’ mean success rates at 1 Million and 300 Million guesses (standard
deviations in parenthesis). The two best and worst are highlighted with green and
red, respectively.
Merged set as it is a composite of other plaintext datasets, and we exclude LinkedIn
as it is hashed and therefore can not be trained on or analyzed in our previous dataset
similarity comparisons. Then, each guesser generates guess lists at cutoffs of 1 million
and 300 million guesses to simulate online and limited offline attacks, respectively. Ta-
ble 5.2 shows the mean success rate and standard deviation of each guesser, computed
by Eq. 3.6 and Eq. 3.7 respectively. At one million guesses, PCFGv4 and Identity
outperform others, while JtR-Markov and OMEN perform the worst. Notably, only
PCFGv4 is able to outperform Identity at this cutoff with a negligible margin. This
suggests that, for online attacks, only PCFGv4 provides a slight improvement over
using the training data as a wordlist. Both Markov-based guessers (i.e., JTR-markov
and OMEN) struggle, though OMEN outperforms JtR-Markov by 5%. As both
guessers perform a more exhaustive search of the password space than other models,
they are less suited to this task.
For three-hundred million guesses, PCFGv4 performs the best, with a 6% lead
over the second best guesser Sem. The Identity guesser performs surprisingly well,
with an average of 30.5% (but a high standard deviation of 14.079%) with at most
21,653,268 guesses compared to 300 million guesses for other guessers.2 In its best
2The upperbound for number of guesses in Identity guesser is derived from maximum number of
unique passwords in our datasets.
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case, the Identity guesser trained on Twitter guesses 56.7% of RockYou, only 10.14%
lower than the best guesser PCFGv4 on that same pair. OMEN under-performs
JtR-Markov, performing worst overall at this cutoff.
5.2.2 Impact of Training Data Choice
We investigate how guessing success rates are impacted by different aspects of training
datasets such as training dataset size, and the similarity between training and testing
datasets. We also investigate how similarities between password datasets are pre-
served in their corresponding password guess lists. We train all six password guessers
on each of the six individual plaintext datasets and test them against every other
plaintext dataset, yielding 180 password cracking scenarios. For all guessers, we set
the cutoff to 300 million guesses.
Figure 5.1 captures the average success rates for various pairs of training and
testing datasets. One can make two important observations: (i) while some datasets
perform well as training data (e.g., Twitter, Mate1), others are much less effective
(e.g., Webhost); (ii) some pairs of datasets are effective for training and testing against
each other, i.e., when one dataset can train guessers well against another dataset (e.g.,
RockYou-Mate1 and Mate1-RockYou, ClixSense-Mate1 and Mate1-ClixSense, etc.).
Although some dataset pairs (e.g., Twitter vs. ClixSense) have similar guessing
success in each direction, most other pairs (e.g., Fling vs. RockYou) have asymmetry
in their guessing ability. This seemingly counter-intuitive observation might be ex-
plained by how differently guessers prioritize their generated passwords based on their
training dataset and its features. These observations motivate us towards a deeper








Figure 5.1: The average success rates for various pairs of training and testing datasets.
Each edge width is proportional to the average success rate of all guessers for a fixed
training and testing dataset. The edge colors match the training dataset color and
also the outer edges are directed clockwise from training to testing dataset. The node
sizes represent the size of the password datasets.
Size of training dataset
We ask whether the success rate of a guesser, on average, increases with the size of
training dataset. Table 5.3 shows the average success rates of each training dataset
over all guessers and target datasets (computed by Eq. 3.8), with datasets ordered
from smallest to largest size. While our largest dataset performs the best, our smallest
dataset ClixSense outperforms both Webhost and RockYou, which are over six and
fifteen times larger than it respectively. We also note that Fling’s success rate is
7.6% lower than Twitter’s despite being very close in size. For a formal analysis, we
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ClixSense Webhost Mate1 RockYou Fling Twitter
33.737% 29.602% 38.167% 30.264% 35.155% 42.815%
Table 5.3: Mean success rates for training password datasets. Datasets are ordered
smallest to largest from left to right.
calculated the statistical correlation between the number of passwords in the training
dataset and the averaged success rate. The resulting Pearson coefficient of 0.189 (p=
0.315) suggests insignificant correlation between training dataset size and success rate.
This result suggests that while size of training dataset might play a role in success
rate, it is not the sole influential factor.
Similarity between training and target datasets
We next focus on how the similarity between training and target datasets impacts
the success rate of guessers. We first compute the cosine similarity and generalized
Jaccard index (see Eq. 3.2 and Eq. 3.4) between password datasets, and then explore
the relationship of these similarities with success rates. This is our only experiment
that can be compared with Ji et al.’s [50], in the sense their work computes simi-
larity using cosine similarity and Jaccard index. Interestingly, although our features,
datasets, and guessers differ, our results confirm their finding that training and target
data similarity has an impact on guesser success rate.
Figure 5.2a shows that that Mate1, Twitter, RockYou and ClixSense have high
structural password similarity (i.e., cosine similarity). Fling and Webhost are dis-
similar to other datasets, but similar to each other. These similarities between these
datasets is likely why Identity performs so well in Section 5.2.1. Figure 5.2b suggests
that the exact overlap between datasets (i.e., generalized Jaccard similarity) is often
low with exceptions for larger datasets (i.e., Fling, Twitter, RockYou and Mate1),





































(d) The Jaccard training similarity.
Figure 5.2: Plaintext datasets with their pairwise (a) cosine similarity, (b) generalized
Jaccard similarity, (c) cosine training similarity, and (d) Jaccard training similarity.
The training similarity between datasets is computed by Eq. 3.12. The edge weights
and colors are based on the corresponding metric value between two datasets. The
node color captures the metric average for the corresponding dataset. The node size
is proportional to the dataset size.
5.1, 5.2a, and 5.2b. In general, the datasets with higher similarity tend to have mu-
tually higher success rates. For example, Mate1 and RockYou share high similarity
and high mutual success rates, but Mate1 is more effective at guessing RockYou than
RockYou is at guessing Mate1 despite Mate1 being smaller than RockYou.
The cross-examination of Figures 5.1, 5.2a, and 5.2b suggest the datasets with
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higher similarity tend to have mutually higher success rates (e.g., Mate1 and Rock-
You share high similarity and mutual success rates). Thus, we hypothesize that the
similarity between training and testing datasets has a positive effect on success rate.
To test this hypothesis, we ran Pearson statistical tests between the similarity metric
of any pair of datasets and the success rates when either dataset is used as training
data to attack the other. Our cosine similarity and Jaccard metric have correlation
coefficients of 0.597 (p = 0.00049) and 0.596 (p = 0.00049) respectively. Both are
significant and large by Cohen’s convention. This further confirms that dataset sim-
ilarity, structural (cosine) or overlap (Jaccard), is a key factor in success rate. These
results compliment previous findings [50] on the relationship between the similarity
of training and testing datasets and guesser success rates.3 However, it should be
noted that when datasets are similar, the larger datasets usually tend to outperform
smaller datasets on average (e.g., Twitter and Mate1 are highly similar, but Twitter
still noticeably outperforms Mate1).
Training similarity between datasets
The surprising performance of ClixSense in Table 5.3, despite its small size, raises
the question of how similarly ClixSense and a bigger dataset can train a guesser, as
smaller training datasets are desirable to reduce training time. So, we next explore
how similarly two datasets can train a guesser using our notion of training similarity
(see Eq. 3.12). We exclude the Identity guesser due to its simplicity in learning; also,
its results mirror dataset similarity (see 5.2.2) as its guesses are a type of summary
of the training data.
Figures 5.2c and 5.2d demonstrate the cosine and Jaccard training similarity be-
3This is our only experiment with partial overlap with other work [50] by computing cosine
similarity and Jaccard index between datasets; however, we not only use a different set of datasets
and guessers, but also our features for cosine similarity differ, and we use Jaccard index between
datasets rather than between their features.
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tween our datasets. The cosine training similarity is relatively high between most
pairs of datasets ranging from 0.71 to 0.93 (see Figure 5.2c). A few exceptions with
moderate training similarity are Fling-RockYou, RockYou-Webhost, and Webhost-
ClixSense. The Jaccard training similarity has a minimum of 0.11 for RockYou-
Webhost and a maximum of 0.25 for RockYou-Mate1 (see Figure 5.2d). The cluster
of RockYou, Twitter, Mate1, and ClixSense share relatively high overlap of gener-
ated passwords (see their pairwise Jaccard training similarity). This means passwords
generated from training with ClixSense, despite its small size, have high overlap with
passwords generated from training with other datasets. In contrast, the Jaccard
training similarity between Fling or Webhost and any other datasets is relatively
low, indicating that they may be better to combine with other datasets for training
purposes.
Cross-examining Figures 5.2a–d, illustrates the relationship between dataset sim-
ilarity and training similarity. When two datasets have low structural (cosine) or
overlap (Jaccard) similarity, their training similarity is notably higher (e.g., Mate1-
Webhost, ClixSense-Fling, Twitter-Webhost, etc.). However, a pair of datasets with
high cosine similarity usually exhibits lower cosine training similarity (e.g., RockYou-
Twitter, Twitter-ClixSense, etc.). The order of similarity usually appears to be pre-
served between datasets: when a pair of datasets (e.g., Fling-RockYou) have lower
similarity than another pair (e.g, RockYou-Twitter), their training similarity follows
the same ordering. These observations could be partly explained by guessers converg-




Our analysis demonstrates that the similarity between training and testing datasets,
and to a lesser extent the size of training dataset, affect the success rate of a guessing
attack. These results compliment the work of Ji et al. [50], as we extract different
features to compute structural similarity and apply Jaccard similarity directly to lists
of passwords instead of their features. Our work also applies these comparisons to the
guess lists generated by guessers, in addition to the datasets, and utilizes a larger set
of real-world datasets. Applying Jaccard directly to the password lists grants one the
benefit of seeing exact password overlap, providing context for structural similarity
(e.g., two guessers might produce guesses that are similar in structure but with little
exact password overlap). We demonstrate that while larger datasets result in higher
success rates on average, the similarity of training and testing datasets has a larger
impact on success than dataset size.
5.3 Password Guessing Behaviour
We investigate the behaviour of each guesser (i.e., their generated guess lists) under
various training and target datasets. We also explore how each guesser compliments
and substitutes others.
5.3.1 Training Independence
We use our training independence metric (Eq. 3.13) to study guessers’ sensitivity
to changes in the training dataset. Guessers with high training independence will
produce similar guesses when trained on different datasets. The two extremes of
training independence are a brute-force guesser with the maximum value of 1 and the
identity guesser with the minimum value (not quite 0 due to overlap between training
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Identity NN OMEN PCFGv4 Sem JtR-Markov
0.03783 0.11296 0.12635 0.19808 0.25595 0.38548
Table 5.4: Guessers’ Jaccard training independence.
datasets). Table 5.4 reports the guessers’ training independence. JTR-Markov and
Identity have the most and least training independence respectively. PCFGv4, with
the highest success rate, has moderate training independence. Interestingly, while
OMEN and NN have similar training independence, their success rates greatly differ
for both the 1 million and 300 million cutoffs. These results suggest that training
independence is not a predictor of success rate, but an effective guesser (e.g., PCFGv4,
NN, and Sem) has training independence in the range of 0.1 to 0.25, implying that
10%–25% of its generated passwords overlap when its training dataset is changed.
5.3.2 Generalizability
One important characteristic of guessers is how well they can generalize, i.e., predict
and generate previously unseen passwords. To measure this, we train each guesser
on the Webhost dataset as it is the least similar to the other datasets, both in terms
of structure (see Figure 5.2a) and actual password overlap (see Figure 5.2b). We
then test the Webhost trained guessers against every other dataset and calculate
each guesser’s mean success rate. Table 5.5 shows the mean success rate of each
guesser: PCFGv4 and NN outperform others, demonstrating a relatively high degree
of generalizability compared to others. The Identity guesser and OMEN perform
notably worse. This is expected for the Identity guesser with its inability to generalize,
but surprising for OMEN. There is a notable amount of variance in the success rates
of guessers with similar approaches: 15% difference between Markov models JtR and
OMEN, and 10% difference between PCFG-based guessers PCFGv4 and Sem. This
highlights how even guessers with similar underlying approaches can display differing
61
Identity OMEN JtR-Markov Sem NN PCFGv4
15.378% 15.664% 30.265% 33.099% 39.585% 43.618%
Table 5.5: Guessers’ generalizability, with 300M guess cutoff. A higher success rate
indicates a better ability to generalize.
Training Dataset Size
Guessers 1 Million 10 Million 30 Million
Identity 21.194% 33.441% 39.853%
JtR 27.570% 27.541% 27.527%
OMEN 29.077% 29.216% 29.461%
Sem 41.493% 46.910% 48.021%
PCFGv4 41.517% 48.719% 51.178%
NN 43.688% 56.500% 58.259%
Table 5.6: The mean percentage of passwords guessed by each guesser when trained
on different-sized subset of Twitter with a cutoff of 300M.
generalization behaviour. When compared to their average performance at the 300M
cutoff (cross-reference Table 5.2), NN experiences the lowest drop in success rate with
dissimilar data (-1.2% difference), and JtR actually improves during this test (+2.7%).
The guesser that performs best with dissimilar data is therefore not necessarily the
one where dissimilar data causes the least impact.
5.3.3 Sensitivity to Training Dataset Size
We intend to learn how each guesser’s success rate is impacted by the size of train-
ing data, drawn from the same distribution. Sampling from the Twitter dataset, we
create three different datasets of sizes 1 million, 10 million and 30 million. After train-
ing each guesser on each dataset, we generate guess lists at a cutoff of 300M and test
them against all other datasets. Table 5.6 reports the mean success rates by Eq. 3.9.
All guessers (except JtR-Markov) improve when trained on the larger dataset, but to
various extents. The Identity guesser has the most drastic improvement with training
size growth, from 21.2% to 39.853%. OMEN and JtR-Markov show the least improve-
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ment. OMEN only improves by 0.3 percent while JtR-Markov surprisingly decreases
in efficacy. Sem, PCFGv4, and NN have more modest, but notable improvements,
increasing their success rates by 6.5%, 9.7%, and 14.6%, respectively. With the ex-
clusion of OMEN, these results follow those of training independence (see Table 5.4),
demonstrating that less independent guessers are typically more heavily impacted by
a dearth of training data.
5.3.4 Guessing Similarity
Using our notion of guessing similarity (see Eq. 3.10), we analyze how similar the guess
lists of two guessers are when they are trained on the same training data. Figure 5.3
shows the cosine and Jaccard guessing similarity between guessers at cutoffs of 1
million and 300 million guesses. For both cutoffs, PCFGv4, Sem, ID and NN share
high structural (cosine) similarity when compared to OMEN and JtR (see Figure 5.3a
and Figure 5.3c). Interestingly, despite both deploying a Markov approach, JtR and
OMEN are dissimilar. As the cutoff increases (compare Figure 5.3a and Figure 5.3c),
we observe that the average structural (cosine) similarity of some guessers slightly
increases (e.g., OMEN, JtR-Markov) while some others slightly decrease (e.g., Identity
and PCFGv4). This suggests that the relative structural similarity of passwords
produced by any pair of guessers remains relatively consistent even as more guesses
are produced.
As the cutoff increases, we observe a large decrease in Jaccard guessing similarity,
which captures the overlap of guessers’ guesses (compare Figure 5.3b and Figure 5.3d).
At a cutoff of 1 million, PCFGv4 and ID have the highest Jaccard guessing simliarity
of 0.424, while at 300 million PCFGv4 and NN are the most similar pair with an index
of 0.148. One can also readily observe that the Jaccard guessing similarities decrease





























(d) Jaccard guessing similarity with 300 million guesses.
Figure 5.3: The cosine and Jaccard guessing similarity (see Eq. 3.10) between guessers
at the cutoffs of 1 million or 300 million guesses. The edge colors represent the
similarity value between two guessers. The edge width further highlights the relative
similarities within a figure (thicker means more similar). The node size represents
the guesser’s average success rate. The node colors represent their average similarity.
each guesser converges to their own unique guessing behaviour (i.e., the percentage
overlap between guessers’ guess lists decreases).
We also find that guessers with higher success rate (see Table 5.2) at either cutoff
tend to have higher overlap (Jaccard similarity). At 1 million, PCFGv4 and ID, the
two best guessers at this cutoff, share the highest overlap. At 300 million, PCFGv4,












Figure 5.4: The generalized Jaccard guessing similarity between guessers for successful
guesses. The edge weights and colors represent the similarity metric between two
guessers. The size of the nodes represent the average success rate of the guesser. The
node colors represent the average similarity of guessers with all other guessers.
At the one million guess cutoff we can observe that higher similarity to the Identity
guesser is an indicator of success. This again suggests the value of training data based
attacks, especially when guesses are restricted. In general, the four top guessers (i.e.,
PCFG, Identity, Sem and the Neural Network) share higher similarity. At three-
hundred million guesses we observe that our best three guessers (i.e., PCFG, Sem and
the Neural Network) share very high relative rates of structural and exact overlap
similarity. Again structural similarity is high with the Identity guesser (the lower
exact similarity is likely a product of the Identity guesser’s low guess count). This
shows that despite structure remaining the same as the cutoff increases, the actual
passwords generated largely diverge.
5.3.5 Successful Guessing Similarity
Our guessing similarity analyses showed that guessers trained on the same data,
generate mostly unique guesses (see Figures 5.3b and 5.3d). However, it is possible
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that many of these unique guesses are unsuccessful. In this light, one might be
interested in measuring the uniqueness of successful guesses between guessers. To
achieve this, we use our successful guessing similarity (see Eq. 3.11) with generalized
Jaccard index.4
As shown in Figure 5.4, there is still a considerable degree of uniqueness in success-
ful guesses. Even, Sem and PCFGv4 with the highest similarity have a generalized
Jaccard index of 0.86, implying that 14% of their successful guesses are unique to
each other. Similarly, NN and Sem, by sharing 72% of their success guesses, owe
28% their success to their unique passwords. Interesting, the Identity guesser seems
to have moderate Jaccard similarity with any other guesser (i.e., its similarity values
range from 0.529 to 0.725) despite its smaller guess lists sizes (i.e., ranging from 2.2
million to 40 million compared to 300 million for all other guessers). These find-
ings offer two important recommendations: (i) the use of one guesser does not make
another guesser entirely redundant, even when the underlying approach or achieved
success rates are similar; (ii) The cost-effective Identity guesser can complement any
other guessers as it has a relatively high number of unique successful guesses despite
it’s incredibly low number of guesses comparatively. Thus, a system administrator
might benefit from applying two or more different guessers for improved password
checking. We explore this possibility in our combination attack discussed below in
Section 5.4.
5.4 Combining Guessers
We evaluate the ability of password guessers to compliment one another on a previ-
ously unseen dataset (i.e., LinkedIn) in an offline attack scenario. We begin in Section
4The generalized Jaccard allows us to weight the successful guesses of each guesser based on their
frequencies in the target dataset.
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OMEN JtR-Markov Identity Sem PCFGv4 NN
35.641% 37.028% 47.561% 55.159% 58.798% 63.145%
Table 5.7: Percentage of LinkedIn passwords successfully guessed. Guessers are
trained on the Merged dataset and cutoff at 2 billion guesses.
5.4.1 by evaluating each individual guesser against the LinkedIn dataset. Next we
analyze different combinations of guessers in Section 5.4.2.
5.4.1 Individual Guessers
To compare guessers’ performance, we train each guesser on the Merged dataset, and
allow them to each make 2 billion guesses against the LinkedIn dataset. This exper-
iment is most similar to the scenario when system administrators perform reactive
checking. As the target dataset is unseen at the time of attack, we cannot easily tune
our training data to suit it. As reported in Table 5.7, the neural network outperforms
all others, with a 4.3% improvement over PCFGv4, the next best guesser. PCFG-
based (PCFGv4 and Sem) and Identity guessers outperform Markov-based guessers
(OMEN and JTR-Markov). Figure 5.5 depicts the percentage of guessed passwords
over the number of guesses. JtR-Markov surpasses OMEN close to the end of the
attack. Notably, PCFGv4, Identity, and NN traded places for the best guesser before
Identity ran out of guesses. We next apply our findings from our successful guess
similarity experiments to further improve the results using combination attacks.
5.4.2 Combination Attacks
Our analyses shed light on how guessers compliment others by generating unique suc-
cessful guesses. In particular, we learn that Identity guesser not only complements
every other guesser, but also often outperforms some advanced guessers. By com-
bining these findings with the knowledge of the incredible cost effectiveness (both in
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Figure 5.5: Performance of guessers trained on the Merged dataset and tested against
LinkedIn. The dotted line marks the Identity guesser’s last guess at 67 million guesses,
each other guesser made 2 billion guesses.
terms of speed and guess numbers) we are motivated to design a combination attack
with the Identity guesser. In this combination attack, the Identity guesser is used to
attack a password dataset prior to the application of a set of other guessers. This
hybrid approach exists in John the Ripper where a traditional John attack follows
wordlist mode. We run many independent combination attacks on LinkedIn, where
the Identity guesser precedes a subset of other guessers. Each guesser is trained on
the Merged Dataset and produces two billion guesses.
The result of our combination attacks are reported in Table 5.8. When ID com-
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Sole Guesser ID + 1 Guesser ID + 2 Guessers
guesser guessed guesser guessed guessers guessed guessers guessed
OMEN 35.641% O 52.272% O+J 57.628% J+P 65.038%
JtR-M 37.028% J 55.693% O+S 61.536% J+N 65.909%
Sem 55.159% S 59.773% O+P 62.907 S+P 63.866%
PCFGv4 58.798% P 61.158% O+N 65.241 S+N 66.411%
NN 63.145% N 64.876% J+S 63.255% P+N 67.0822%
ID + 3 Guessers ID + 4 Guessers
guessers guessed guessers guessed guessers guessed
O+J+S 63.825% O+P+N 67.336% O+J+S+P 66.931%
O+J+P 65.466% J+S+P 66.614% O+J+S+N 67.484%
O+J+N 66.199% J+S+N 67.247% O+J+P+N 68.060%
O+S+P 65.260% J+P+N 67.855% O+S+P+N 68.169%
O+S+N 66.705% S+P+N 67.943% J+S+P+N 68.605%
Table 5.8: The percentage of LinkedIn passwords cracked by an offline attack using
the Identity guesser followed by a combination of guessers, each making two billion
guesses. The names of guessers are shortened to their first letters: (P)CFG, (O)MEN,
(N)N, (S)em, and (J)tR-Markov. Each combination attack is color-coded by its se-
quential runtime for training and guess generation of its guessers: Green is less than
8 hours (i.e., a workday), yellow is less than 16 hours, and red is over two weeks.
bined with any individual guesser (e.g., ID+O, ID+J, etc.), the combination attacks
experience a notable degree of improvement compared to an individual guesser’s per-
formance (compare the columns of sole guesser vs. ID + guesser in Table 5.8). JtR-
Markov experiences the largest improvement of 18.67%. Even guessers with high
success rates (e.g., NN and PCFGv4) realize improvements of 1% to 4%. By dramat-
ically increasing the success rate of weaker guessers (e.g., OMEN and JTR-Markov),
this combined approach makes less resource intensive guessers more competitive.
As shown in Table 5.8, when more guessers are combined with the Identity guesser,
the success rate increases, but with diminishing returns. For example, compare J to
J+S (+7.562%), J+S to J+S+P (+3.359%), and J+S+P to J+S+P+N (+1.991%).
There seems to be two factors in determining which additional guesser can improve an
existing combination attack the most: the success rate of the candidate guesser, and
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its successful guessing similarities with each of the combined guessers. A candidate
guesser with higher success rate has more potential to improve the combined guesser
(e.g., compare O+J to O+S). However, the candidate guesser with low successful
guessing similarities can be a more effective addition. This interplay of success rate
and successful guessing similarities might make a less successful guesser with lower
successful guessing similarities more attractive. For example, the weaker JtR and
stronger Sem have successful guessing similarities of 0.675 and 0.902 to PCFGv4.
The addition of JtR to the combination attack of ID+P offers more improvement
than the addition of Sem (3.88% vs. 2.71%).
Each additional guesser also incurs higher runtime and resource requirements.
The attacks color-coded green in Table 5.8 could be completed within one workday
(or 8 hours), whereas the yellow and red color-coded attacks must be run overnight
(within 8-16 hours) and over two weeks, respectively. The neural network is the
largest contributor to runtime in our combinations and also adds GPU requirements.
Interestingly, unlike the sole guesser attacks, the slower combination attacks don’t
always outperform the faster attacks. For example, the O+J+P attack (65.466%) runs
in under 8 hours while N (64.875%), O+N (65.241%), S+P (63.866%) and O+S+P
(65.250%) take between 13 hours to 2 weeks. This result implies that competitive
success rates can be achieved by the combination of computationally-cheap guessers
with less resources. These combination attacks serve as a competitive alternative for
system administrators without access to GPU resources, or with time constraints to
perform reactive checking (e.g., J+P attack outperforms the neural network while




Our work provides a number of practical recommendations (R1-R5) for system admin-
istrators auditing their password databases. While our work can be directly applied
to reactive checking, it has a natural extension to proactive checking, as each of the
guessers we explored can be used to generate probability scores for a given password
and applied as password meters.
R1: Try publicly-available leaked passwords as a guess list. Our results
show that an attacker can be relatively successful by applying Identity guesser (i.e.,
the training data of leaked passwords as a guess list) before considering any advanced
guessers. For online attacks, the Identity guesser along with PCFGv4 outperform
more advanced guessers. For offline attacks, the Identity guesser performed surpris-
ingly well; with only 22 million guesses, on average it achieved 64% of the success
rate of the top offline guesser PCFGv4 with 300 million guesses (see Table 5.2). Ad-
ditionally, in our LinkedIn experiments, the Identity guesser, with 78 million guesses,
had 75% the success rate of the top guesser, with 2 billion guesses (NN, see Table
5.7). These experiments strongly suggest that the Identity guesser can achieve high
guessing success rates, which are comparable to the top guessers and use at least an
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order of magnitude fewer guesses. Additionally, using the approx. 78 million guesses
of the Merged Dataset, it was able to guess 75% the number of LinkedIn passwords as
the top LinkedIn guesser in 2 billion guesses (NN, see Table 5.7). Thus, we strongly
recommend that leaked password datasets should be the first priority in password
checking (and ideally used as a blacklist). For this purpose, services such as Have I
Been Pwned [45] can be useful.
R2: Apply combinations of guessers. Our results for guessing similarity show
that the majority of guesses produced by each guesser are unique, even when the
underlying approach or success rate is similar. Even for successful guesses, each tested
guesser is able to crack passwords that others overlook (e.g., Identity guessed millions
of LinkedIn passwords overlooked by other guessers). Our analysis indicates that
no single guesser is able to completely substitute another, and when used together,
which guessers compliment each other best. We also show how some combinations of
guessers can have comparably high success rates with lower computing requirements.
For example, in less than 8 hours and without GPU resources, Identity + PCFGv4
+ JtR-Markov can achieve a success rate that compares to Identity + NN (which
takes about 2 weeks and requires GPU resources). Considering both success rate
and computing requirements, our results from targeting LinkedIn passwords suggest
that a reasonable strategy is to apply this ordering of guessers: Identity, PCFGv4,
JtR-Markov, Sem, OMEN, NN.
R3: Train with datasets similar to target. Our results show that when choosing
training data, the similarity to the target data is an important factor. Thus, our
metric of dataset similarity can be used to decide on the most effective training
dataset. While our proposed statistics can be applied using any metric of similarity
(e.g., Jaccard index), or set of features, we chose to use actual passwords and policy-
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based features. As such, our results reflect similarity based on the actual passwords
and policy-level characteristics (i.e., number of character classes and length), so a
reasonable shorthand is to select a training dataset with a matching password policy.
System administrators should therefore attempt to match their training data to the
policies that exist in their own systems to maximize similarity and improve the success
rate of their attacks
R4: Consider using less training data. Using more training data takes more
computing resources, both in terms of longer training times and data storage. Our
results indicate that training dataset size does not correlate with guessing success
rates. Although when sampling from the same dataset (Twitter), we observed that
data size can increase training effectiveness, the gains between 1 million and 30 million
training passwords are not as large as one might expect. Therefore, if time or space
constraints exist, a reasonable compromise would be to use a sample of training data
from a dataset with high similarity (such as Twitter in our experiments).
R5: Use generalizable guessers if unsure about similarity. When there is
considerable uncertainty of the similarity of training data, a better approach would be
to use the most generalizable guessers. Our results indicate that the guessers ordered
from the highest to the lowest generalizablility are: PCFGv4, NN, Sem, JtR-Markov,
OMEN, and lastly Identity.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
We provide an in-depth analysis of password guessers, revealing insights regarding
their behaviours and capabilities, and when and how to use them (both alone and in
combination). This information provides insight into some of the underlying factors
that affect the behaviour of different password guessers. Comparing guessers against
each other allowed us to understand their differences and relative similarities.
We leverage this knowledge to construct combination attacks which can strengthen
weaker guessers and provide alternatives for system administrators working with lim-
ited time or resources. This work also demonstrates that combinations of computationally-
cheap guessers can be comparably effective to more resource-intensive guessers. Our
work allows us to provide a set of evidence-based recommendations to system admin-
istrators who use password checking tools. To assist practitioners as new guessers
emerge in the future, we suggest that future research in password guessers provide
runtime and resource requirements, and contrast this with the approaches to which
they compare success rates.
Our proposed analytical framework (i.e., various metrics and statistics) for com-
paring password guessers and training datasets can be utilized or extended by practi-
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tioners and researchers for future password studies. The framework is designed with
metrics and statistics which could be applied to any similarity metric (i.e., they are
not limited to cosine similarity or Jaccard index) or set of features. In future work,
other similarity metrics and/or features can be applied for further analysis. Another
interesting direction for future work is to explore how to summarize a large training
dataset into a smaller dataset that trains guessers just as well. Such a smaller training
dataset would decrease training time and aim to maximize success rate.
Further work may also determine how heavily impacted guessers can be made more
robust to data restriction or how datasets can be tailored to perform better with highly
dependent guessers. Another interesting direction would be to accurately determine
a similar password dataset to use for training when various features of the target
dataset are unknown. One could also look towards developing artificial intelligence
algorithms to assist system administrators in finding optimal combinations of guessers
with a maximum success rate under budgeted time and resource requirements.
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[21] Castelluccia, C., Dürmuth, M., and Perito, D. Adaptive password-
strength meters from markov models. In Proceedings of the 2012 Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (2012).
[22] Chen, B.-L., Kuo, W.-C., and Wuu, L.-C. Robust smart-card-based remote
user password authentication scheme. International Journal of Communication
Systems 27, 2 (2014), 377–389.
78
[23] Chien, H.-Y., Jan, J.-K., and Tseng, Y.-M. An efficient and practical
solution to remote authentication: smart card. Computers & Security 21, 4
(2002), 372–375.
[24] Cubrilovic, N. Rockyou hack: From bad to worse. TechCrunch
(Dec 2009). https://techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hack-security-
myspace-facebook-passwords/, Last Accessed: November 9, 2020.
[25] Das, A., Bonneau, J., Caesar, M., Borisov, N., and Wang, X. The tan-
gled web of password reuse. In Proceedings of the 2014 Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (2014), pp. 23–26.
[26] Das, S. 40 million fling.com users’ passwords, sexual preferences stolen.
Hacked (May 2016). https://hacked.com/40-million-fling-com-users-
passwords-sexual-preferences-stolen/, Last Accessed: June 15, 2020.
[27] Databases Today. twitter.7z. https://web.archive.org/web/
20190707133719/https://databases.today/search-nojs.php, 2019. This is
an archived version of the now defunct website, close to the date the dataset
was retrieved.
[28] Daugman, J. How iris recognition works. In The essential guide to image
processing. Elsevier, 2009, pp. 715–739.
[29] de Carné de Carnavalet, X., and Mannan, M. From very weak to very
strong: Analyzing password-strength meters. In Proceedings of the 2014 Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium (2014), pp. 23–26.
[30] Dunham, M. H. Data Mining: Introductory and Advanced Topics. Pearson
Education India, 2002.
79
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